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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper I study the effects of the introduction of Treu package on the hazard rate of moving from a 
temporary job to a stable work in Italy. In order to enhance the flexibility of labour market and to stress 
the capabilities to create job, a progressive liberalization of flexible contracts has been adopted in Italy 
during the ‘90s, widening their scope and easing their adoption. The empirical exercise is carried out 
using an administrative dataset, Clap, extracted by the social security archives for the years 1992-2002. I 
apply a parametric and semi-parametric continuous time duration model to investigate whether the recent 
reform has changed the pattern of duration dependence in temporary employment duration. The main 
findings emphasize how the Treu package has substantially reduced the positive duration dependence in 
the hazard rate of moving from temporary to permanent employment. This result is robust to different 
specifications adopted for the baseline hazard. However, an even stronger conclusion concerns the 
temporary work agency (TWA) employment which exhibits a negative duration dependence in the post-
reform period, probably indicating a negative relation between contract duration and the probability to 
moving into permanent employment for this contractual type. Finally I find large differences in terms of 
individual and job-related characteristics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since the mid-1980s several European countries enhanced the flexibility of their labour market 
in order to cope with the high and persistent unemployment. During the last years, reforms 
aimed at increasing flexibility have been introduced in the Italian labour market. Generally the 
strategy used is consisted in implementation of the reform “at the margin”, allowing for 
temporary employment without changing EPL for permanent jobs. Standard insider-outsider 
framework may provide a first explanation for the prevalence of this such an approach in which 
the traditional standard work has been exempted from labour market liberalization. As 
consequence, temporary jobs have been widely used and accounted for a growing share of the 
employed workforce in countries with rigid employment protection. 
Temporary employment may potentially provide a path of entry into the stable jobs, but it is 
often associated with precarious labour condition and thus likely with lower job quality. There 
is an extensive debate on the extent to which such jobs help unemployed workers, providing 
them opportunities to gain work experience and acquire human capital, to deepen the attachment 
to the labour market. 
Nevertheless the risk of experiencing precarious career paths can therefore be higher for people 
in such flexible contractual arrangements. There is an extensive literature that analyzes whether 
the existence of temporary contracts exacerbates the inherent precariousness in the labour 
market. Several studies have investigated the impact of fixed-term works on specific groups and 
the role of the unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence, to examine labour market 
transitions over time (Tattara and Valentini, 2006).   
Indeed temporary work experience may be informative about the ability of the individuals. 
Some empirical studies evidence that the employers use flexible contracts as a way of screening 
for the stable works and to cope with demand fluctuations, in this way lowering adjustment 
costs in a traditional labour market characterized by a wide use of permanent contracts with 
costly firing regulations. Thus flexibility may be a choice on the demand’s side, but it can 
worsen life’s conditions for those workers passing through it, enhancing the level of 
precariousness in the labour market and raising concern among policy-makers (see Booth et al, 
2002; D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005). 
Although numerous attempts to investigate the consequence of fixed-term contracts, some 
consensus has formed among economist that the flexibility does not necessarily increase the 
overall employment level and produces segmentation in the labour market, creating a strong 
dualism between insiders and outsiders. Several theoretical investigations (Dolado et al., 2002; 
Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002) have been carried out in order to 
analyze the effects of flexible contracts and to isolate the mechanism through which temporary 
employment modify labour market equilibrium. Despite the large diffusion of two-tier labour 
marker reforms in Europe, macroeconomic studies in the context of matching models of the 
labour market have argued that the combination of deregulated temporary jobs and positive 
firing costs on stable employment may have a perverse impact in terms of aggregate 
unemployment and welfare. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) investigate the transitional dynamics of 
such two tier reform strategies and they argued the presence of a link between the recent 
growth-less job creation and the partial labour market reforms introduced in the European 
labour market in the ‘90s. 
Thus, more recently, the debate has focused upon the negative implications of a segmented 
labour market in which atypical workers operate in low-wage jobs and firms may be less 
inclined to invest in training, reducing the quality of the match between worker and firm (Güell 
and Petrongolo, 2007) 
However the crucial question is the extent to which temporary jobs help individual workers to 
move from fixed-term to permanent employment, that is, the extent to which flexible contract 
acts as a stepping stone to stable job. Another important point concerns the pattern of promotion 
into indefinite duration jobs for temporary workers but mixed employment effects do not a 
provide clear signal that the atypical contracts are associated with good performances in terms 
of subsequent careers and wages.  
This study aims at providing a description of the transition patterns of temporary workers 
towards a stable job in the Italian labour market and an identification of the duration 
dependence associated with less favourable working histories. In order to disentangle the duality 
of labour market I focus on exit margin, i.e. the transition after a temporary experience. In doing 
this, I estimate a duration model of temporary employment. 
It has been often argued that the entry in temporary employment represents a first stepping stone 
into stable employment, increasing the probability of moving into permanent jobs with respect 
to the unemployed workers. As the extensive literature for the Spanish labour market has 
shown, the entry margin evidences little variation, while the main source of duality lies in the 
exit margin (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). 
The typical framework in the study of labour market transition is the job-search model where 
the duration of each working spell is specified as the conditional probability of leaving that 
spell, i.e. the hazard rate (Cahuc and Zylberg, 2004; D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005). 
The empirical analysis in this study is based therefore on Clap (Campione Longitudinale dei 
Lavoratori Attivi e dei Pensionati) dataset, an administrative archive from the Social Security 
records (INPS), provided by Labour Minister. It consists of individual working histories and 
reports the sequence of daily contiguous spells. To evaluate whether the Treu package has 
modified the conversion pattern, I select a sub-sample that spans for the years 1993-2002. The 
modelling framework avoids the left-censoring issue in labour market histories. Then to assess 
the duration dependence in the transitions from temporary to permanent employment, I adopt a 
single risk mixed proportional hazard (PH) model, employing both parametric and semi-
parametric baseline hazard. This study complements previous literature investigating whether 
the partial labour market reforms introduced in the Italian labour market during the ‘90s have 
modified the duration dependence pattern in the transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment. Moreover, I provide further evidence on the timing of conversion for different 
atypical contracts, such as fixed-term work and temporary work agency (TWA) employment .  
The main empirical findings show that the introduction of Treu reform has substantially reduced 
the positive duration dependence in the probability of moving from a temporary work to a stable 
job. However, the results on positive duration dependence suggests the persistence of a human 
capital accumulation effect also in the post-reform period. Differently, the TWA employment 
reports a negative duration dependence in the post-reform period, which indicates a negative 
relation between contract duration and the hazard rate of moving into permanent employment, 
emphasizing the concerns about the inherent precariousness of this specific contractual form. 
Finally individual heterogeneity in terms of personal and job-related characteristics explains a 
large amount of differences in labour market performance.  
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 describes 
the dataset used and presents some preliminary descriptive evidence. Section 4 introduces the 
PH econometric model performed to investigate the impact of the Treu reform on the duration 
pattern in the transition from temporary to permanent employment. Section 5 reports the 
empirical findings and the sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results and section 
6 draws the conclusion 
 
 
2. Literature review on temporary employment 
 
Previous research has extensively focused on several aspects of temporary employment to 
emphasize the impact of flexible contracts on labour market in OECD countries. In addition, an 
issue much debated has been at what extent the persistence of European unemployment has 
been exacerbated by the labour market institutions and in particular the discussion has stressed 
the role of employment protection legislation (EPL). Therefore, in order to reduce the high level 
of unemployment, several European countries have gradually enhanced the flexibility in the 
labour market, allowing the use of temporary contracts with low firing costs.  
Thus a significant feature of most reforms is that they are reforms “at the margin”, which simply 
add further distortions without changing the strict dismissal costs for permanent contracts. The 
insiders-outsider models may provide an explanation for the prevalence of such an approach 
which could have undesirable consequence in terms of labour market segmentation. 
However the introduction of fixed-term contracts has generally favoured a reduction of 
unemployment rates and raised the dynamicity of the European labour market. In addition, it 
has been often argued that employment spells in temporary jobs can increase workers’ human 
capital and provide the opportunities to acquire work experience and labour market contacts 
which might favour the subsequent transition to a stable job. Thus, whether a flexible contract 
can improve the labour market outcomes of the unemployed, representing a stepping stone 
towards a permanent job, has recently become the crucial question for the empirical studies. 
In this contest Sciulli (2006) studies the impact of a partial labour market reform in Italy (the so-
called Treu package) aimed at introducing a two-tier system and allowing temporary 
employment. Applying a proportional hazard model with competing risks, he compares the 
transition rate between work spells started before and after the exact day of introduction of the 
reform, exploiting a sample of young worker (aged 16 to 32). In the post-reform period, he finds 
an increase in negative duration dependence for non working state outflow, i.e. a worsening of 
the duality between the short-term and long-term unemployed. Moreover, having previous 
atypical job experiences reduces the probability of finding a permanent work for the 
unemployed, while there is no evidence that the probability of moving to a permanent job is 
higher for atypical workers than for the unemployed. However Sciulli (2006) finds a positive 
duration dependence for the transitions from temporary to permanent employment, suggesting 
the presence of a human capital accumulation effect. Finally the individuals’ heterogeneity in 
terms of geographic, gender and occupation variables accounts for a large amount of differences 
in labour market transitions. 
Picchio (2007) tries to assess whether a temporary job experience represents a springboard 
towards a stable job or a trap of precariousness, comparing the probability of finding a 
permanent work for the temporary and unemployed workers. In order to provide the true 
stepping stone effect, he estimates a bivariate random effect probit model. The main finding 
suggest that a temporary job, rather than unemployment, increases the 2-year after probability of 
moving to a permanent work by 13-16 percentage points. Corsini and Guerrazzi (2007) provide 
a probabilistic evaluation of the transition from temporary to permanent employment in a 
regional contest, applying a multinomial nested logit estimation strategy, in order to account for 
the decisions made by the workers and those made by the employers. The model is based on 
two steps. In the first, the worker decides whether or not to participate in the labour market and 
whether as employee or self-employed. In the second, the firm decides whether or not to hire the 
worker and what type of contract offers. Their results show a stabilization probability equal to 
61% but display significant heterogeneity across workers’ characteristics. For instance, atypical 
contracts may represent a precariousness trap for women and older workers.  
Berton et al. (2007) study the labour market transitions of young entrants and consider seven 
labour market states: permanent and temporary employment, apprenticeship, training 
programmes, self-employment, quasi subordinate jobs and unemployment, applying a dynamic 
multinomial logit model and controlling for individual fixed effects. The empirical analysis 
provides some interesting results. First of all, individual heterogeneity explains part of the 
observed transition rates and whatever the entry state, keeping the same contract is the most 
likely destination. This indicates the presence of true state dependence. Finally 1-year after all 
atypical contracts display a significant probability of moving to open-end contract. In this sense, 
the stepping stone hypothesis holds, in particular for the CFL. Berton (2008) and Alboni et al. 
(2008) provide further evidence on the stepping-stone effect using the timing of the events 
approach.1  
While in Italy the introduction of partial labour market reform is a relatively recent issue, two-
tier strategies have been applied since the mid-80s in Spain to foster job creation and to develop 
a more dynamic labour market. Alba-Ramirez (1998) and Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) have found 
that the probability of finding a permanent work reduces after some previous fixed-term 
contracts, i.e. it is not atypical contract per se but its intermittent nature that is detrimental in 
terms of career prospects. Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon (2003) examine to what extent 
Temporary Help Agency (THA) intermediation affects workers’ transitions into and out of 
employment, focusing upon the Spanish youth labour market and exploiting a discrete-time 
duration model. The findings on the success of THAs as a recruitment method are two-fold. On 
the one hand, the results show that those intermediaries help the unemployed workers to gain a 
new job.2 On the other hand, job tenure in THA works is lower than for the other temporary 
contracts. Moreover, the probability of exiting from employment is negatively affected by job 
                                                 
1 Gagliarducci (2005) also apply duration model to investigate the impact of repeated flexible contracts on the 
probability of moving into a stable job. He finds that good jobs are converted into permanent works after the initial 
screening while longer atypical jobs display a decreasing probability of being converted over time. Moreover, 
experiencing repeated temporary works (and in particular interruptions) are detrimental in order to find a stable job. 
2 In particular for short-term unemployed individuals. 
tenure and increases with the duration of fixed-term contract. Finally individuals’ heterogeneity 
explains a large amount of the difference in the hazard rate of finding a job.3  
Güell and Petrongolo (2007) estimate a duration model with competing risk and flexible 
duration dependence in order to study the duration pattern of temporary contracts and their 
conversion into permanent employment versus alternative states. The results show that the 
conversion rate from fixed-term to permanent contract is rather low and it concentrates at three 
years of duration, close to the deadline of the temporary contract. However, there is another 
spike in the conversion rate around one year, suggesting in this case that atypical contracts are 
also used as a screening device. 
Empirical research for other European countries provides evidence that temporary employment 
may indeed represent a stepping stone into a stable job. For instance, Hagen (2002) finds that 
escaping unemployment through a temporary job experience enhances the future employment 
chances for the unemployed workers both for temporary and permanent job in the West 
Germany labour market. Similar results are found in Booth et al. (2002) for the UK. Finally 
D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) focus upon the determinants of the transitions out of temporary 
employment in order to identify factors that are likely to increase the risk of precariousness for 
atypical workers and to understand whether fixed-term works provide a stepping stone effect for 
a stable job. They use a discrete-time duration model with competing risk in a multinomial logit 
framework.  
 
  
3. Dataset  
 
The data used in this study are extracted from the Clap (Campione Longitudinale degli Attivi e 
dei Pensionati), an administrative archive which spans the years 1985-2002. The original 
dataset collects the Social Security records in order to describe the functioning of the Italian 
labour market and to investigate the recent evolution of flexible contracts. Moreover, it includes 
a representative dynamic population of about 500.000 individuals. 
The selection rule is based on a 1/90 random sample of employees born on the 10th of March, 
June, September and December of each year in the sample. The archives provide information on 
each worker that from the 1985 has paid some contributions to INPS, distinguishing between 
                                                 
3 In addition, similar results in terms of mobility patterns after the 1997 reforms are reported also in Kugler et al. 
(2002). 
permanent or temporary contracts4 and individuals who are unemployed or retired. Therefore 
the sample provides a detailed description of the stock of workers, unemployed and retired 
under INPS regime, excluding the main part of public employees and worker employed with the 
Continuative and Coordinate Collaboration (Co.Co.Co.) contracts that are linked to other social 
security regime.5  
This dataset collects individual longitudinal observations using social security records, showing 
directly monthly information about the duration of each spell. A peculiar feature of these 
archives, created by INPS to compute the retirement benefits, is that it follows individuals who 
move both into self-employment, the agricultural sector, as well as unemployment and 
retirement. However it is not possible to indirectly determine the non-working spells6 because 
the transitions towards the public sector or the Co.co.co. are excluded, so I cannot distinguish 
between unemployment spell or exit from the sample.    
I have information about worker’s demographic characteristics, as age and gender, the type of 
occupation (white-collar, blue-collar, apprenticeship and other limited figures), wage, the initial 
and final month of job matches and crucial for this paper the type of contract (i.e. temporary or 
permanent) and the job duration (i.e. the tenure in months from the start of the contract). 
Moreover the dataset includes a firm identifier, that for dependent employment, makes possible 
to observe the change of firm for the on-the job transitions. However I do not assess whether 
they are quits or layoffs.  
In this sense CLAP has been collected to evaluate labour policies, classifying each individual 
according to a specific working status and then identifying the entry and the exit from each 
category under observation. Therefore the administrative archives represent an important 
resource to study individual work history and to assess the impact of the Treu reform in the 
worker flows (Contini and Trivellato, 2005; Sciulli, 2006).  
 
 
3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
To investigate whether Treu package has modified the duration dependence related to the out-
flows from temporary employment and whether the “flexibility at the margin” has increased the 
transitions towards a permanent work, I select a sub-sample using the information from 1992 
                                                 
4 The information is inferred by the contribution paid to INPS. From the type of contributions it is possible to identify 
individuals employed with a fixed-term contract, a CFLs (work training contracts) and interim work (or temporary 
work agency (TWA) employment after the 1997 reform).   
5 Individuals employed with a Co.Co.Co. contract are classified in the Italian legislation as self-employed and so they 
are not included in the sample of employees in the INPS archives. 
6 As the difference between the end of the previous contract and the start of the subsequent one 
and 2002 for individuals aged 16 to 55, who enters in the sample the first time after the January 
1st 1992 and having at least one job spell in the years under observation. This makes possible to 
reconstruct the complete work history from the entry in the sample, excluding all individuals 
whose recorded spells began before 1992.  
Constructing my sub-sample, if an individual presents at the same time more than one job 
relationship, I eliminate the shorter work relationship characterized by fewer day of effective 
work. Furthermore, when the second work starts before of the end of the first, but ends after it, I 
decide to censor at the left the second job spell, so assuming that the second job starts only 
when the first ends. I adopt this strategy in order to better reconstruct the individual working 
history and the passage from double work to a single one is considered as a job to job transition. 
Finally, I assume that this procedure and the elimination of multiple contemporary spells leave 
the sub-sample to be representative. 
 
 
Table 1:  Average survival time in temporary employment by individual and job-related 
characteristics: a comparison of pre and post Treu refom period 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
Female Median = 1276 
n.obs = 7371 
Median = 1156 
n.obs = 13626 
Male Median = 1126 
n.obs = 8387 
Median = 1095 
n.obs = 14689 
North-west Median = 944 
n.obs = 3798 
Median = 854 
n.obs = 7455 
North-east Median = 1094 
n.obs = 3391 
Median = 1187 
n.obs = 6057 
Center  Median = 1090 
n.obs = 2938 
Median = 1126 
n.obs = 5789 
South Median = 1507 
n.obs = 4289 
Median = 1491 
n.obs = 7661 
Blue-collar Median = 760 
n.obs = 2256 
Median = 729 
n.obs = 8664 
White-collar Median = 735 
n.obs = 2010 
Median = 727 
n.obs = 5680 
Training job Median = 1094 
n.obs = 6142 
Median = 1265 
n.obs = 10217 
Age16-24 Median = 1094 
n.obs = 11077 
Median = 1217 
n.obs = 18077 
Age25-33 Median = 1415 
n.obs = 3672 
Median = 758 
n.obs = 8522 
Foreigners Median = 1867 
n.obs = 3189 
Median = 1460 
n.obs = 7384 
                       Source: elaboration on Clap data 
 
 
As suggested in several empirical studies, I exclude from the sample all workers with one or 
more episodes of self-employment since their decision are driven also by more complex 
motivation. Then the selection on age is implemented to follow the standard statistical 
classification of the workforce and to avoid the inclusion of the workers that have exceeded the 
limit for retirement but keep themselves in the labour market. In particular the exclusion of 
older individuals (55-65 aged) is justified by the fact that the employment volatility close to 
retirement may modify the real impact of higher flexibility on duration dependence in the 
transition towards a stable job.  
The sub-sample spans for the years 1992-2002 and it records 198,756 spells for 44,089 
individuals (66,275 permanent contract, 126,986 temporary and 5,495 unemployed). Moreover, 
to perform the comparison between the pre-reform period and the post-reform one, I divide my 
sub-sample in two groups. In the first I put all the spells started and ended before the Treu law 
(June 24th 1997), while in the second I consider the work relationships started after the approval 
of the package. Further I define as right censored spells all the episodes starting before the 
reform and ending after it. This strategy leaves me 48,517 spells for 15,763 individuals (11,714 
permanent contract, 35,704 temporary one and 1,099 unemployed) in the pre-reform period and 
85,437 spells for 28,326 individuals (18,602 permanent contract, 65,382 temporary contract and 
1,453 unemployed) in the post-reform one. 
 
 
Table 2: Sample characteristics of temporary workers 
 Complete sample Pre-reform Post-reform 
Female 0.46 (0.49) 0.48  (0.49) 0.46 (0.49) 
Age 25.18 (6.66) 23.50 (6.71) 24.70 (6.57) 
Temporary 0.638 (0.48) 0.73  (0.44) 0.76 (0.42) 
Unemployed 0.027 (0.16) 0.02  (0.14) 0.02 (0.12) 
Permanent 0.333 (0.47) 0.24  (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 
Average daily tenure 228.01 (130.85) 242.48 (127.44) 200.60 (130.23) 
North-west 0.30 (0.45) 0.29 (0.44) 0.30 (0.45) 
North-east 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 
Center 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.38) 0.20 (0.40) 
South 0.25 (0.42) 0.26 (0.43) 0.26 (0.42) 
Economic growth 1.63 (1.13) 1.64 (1.38) 1.56 (1.07) 
Year93 0.03 (0.15) 0.09 (0.29) - 
Year94 0.03 (0.17) 0.13 (0.34) - 
Year95 0.04 (0.20) 0.18 (0.39) - 
Year96 0.06 (0.23) 0.24 (0.43) - 
Year97 0.06 (0.25) 0.26 (0.44) 0.03 (0.11) 
Year98 0.10 (0.28) - 0.08 (0.24) 
Year99 0.11 (0.32) - 0.12 (0.32) 
Year00 0.15 (0.35) - 0.19 (0.39) 
Year01 0.18 (0.38) - 0.25 (0.44) 
Year02 0.20 (0.40) - 0.33 (0.47) 
Immigrant 0.18 (0.39) 0.16 (1.38) 0.21 (0.40) 
White-collar 0.21 (0.40) 0.17 (0.37) 0.22 (0.41) 
Blue-collar 0.34 (0.47) 0.25 (0.43) 0.38 (0.48) 
      Source: elaboration on Clap data, standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. 
Table 1 reports the average survival time in temporary employment by individual and job-
related characteristics. The results show that after the reform there is a reduction in the survival 
time in temporary job, larger for women. Looking at the regional variation, the assessment is 
not completely clear with huge differences between the different macro-regions. Moreover, the 
foreign workers report a lower average survival time in temporary job during the post-reform 
period. For what concerns the job-related characteristics, the blue-collar displays a larger 
reduction than the white collar, but the lack of educational attainment makes less clear these 
results.  
Differently, table 2 shows the sample characteristics, comparing the pre and post-reform period. 
An interesting feature concerns the foreigners: in the second half of the ‘90s I can observe an 
increasing share of foreign workers in the employment dynamics, with a growth of five 
percentage points between the pre and post reform period (16% against 21%).  
 
 
4. Econometric specification 
 
The standard approach to modelling individual transitions in the labour market is based on job-
search framework and on the event history analysis which tries to explain whether certain 
individuals are at a higher risk of experiencing the event of interest than others. 
The key concept in this class of model is the hazard rate, defined as the product of the 
probability of receiving a job offer in a given period and the probability that such an offer will 
be accepted (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The hazard rate can be interpreted as the reduced-
form of a standard job-search framework and modelled through the conditional probability of 
leaving a state. In practice, it depends on individual observed characteristics and other variables 
likely to influence the cost of the search behaviour as well as on the duration an individual has 
already spent in the starting state. 
In other words, the hazard model concerns an approach in which the risk of experiencing an 
event at a certain time point is predicted with a series of covariates. This type of model presents 
several special features with respect to other standard regression model. First of all, it deals with 
the presence of censored observation, i.e. when the event of interest is not yet occurred during 
the time of observation. Then, in the duration model the covariates may change their value 
during the observation period, so introducing a sort of dynamic analysis. Finally, duration 
models concentrate on distributional issue regarding both the survival time and the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the transition probabilities. 
Defining the hazard function as the instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event, it assumes the 
following form:  
 { }
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tTdttTt
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where the numerator of this equation is the conditional probability that the event will occur in 
the interval ),( dttt + , given that it’s not occurred before. The conditional probability in the 
numerator may be written as the ratio of the joint probability that T is in the interval ),( dttt +  
and tT >  to the probability of the condition tT > . 
The hazard rate may be indicate also as follows: 
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i.e. the ratio between the probability density function of an event at t  ( )(tf ) and the 
probability of surviving until time t  without experiencing the event, which is defined as 
)(1)( tFtS −= . 
The focus of this study is to estimate the determinants of worker’s transitions from temporary to 
permanent employment. Thus I select a sub-sample of individuals who enters with a fixed-term 
work, observing the transition process out of temporary employment towards a permanent job 
(Guell and Petrongolo, 2003). The administrative data used in this empirical studies provide 
monthly information about the spell duration and allow to investigate the individual working 
history, identifying the initial condition and the type of transition whether the spell is 
uncensored.  
In practice, the objective is to describe a sequence of =it { } ),....,1( Nnnit ∈  of contiguous spells in a 
well-defined state, where it  is the elapsed duration for each episodes and n  represents the nth 
spell of individual i. I apply a single risk mixed proportional hazard model (MPH) which allow 
for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. As suggested in the literature (Lancaster, 1979), 
the proportional hazard model not controlling for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity may 
imply bias estimates and in particular it may lead to underestimation of the slope of hazard 
function. Further neglecting unobserved heterogeneity can also impact on the proportional 
impact of a change in a covariate on the hazard rate (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
The temporary work can finish with the conversion into a permanent contract or alternative 
destination states and in this case I should consider an independent single risk model that 
separates exit into permanent employment from exit into any other state. Therefore, exploiting 
some theoretical results, as explained in Guell and Petrongolo (2007), I can treat all temporary 
spells that do no end in a permanent contract as censored, without the need to distinguish the 
destination states. 
The model is in continuous time where the elapsed duration is measured in days and the 
individual covariates have a fixed value at the beginning of each episode. Assuming the 
presence of n individuals, Ni ,....,1= , I define the hazard rate denoting the probability of the 
transition out of the origin state (temporary work) as a continuous process towards destination 
state (permanent job) 
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where i0λ  defines the baseline hazard, which measures the effect of time spent in the origin 
state on the subsequent transition, i.e. what it is called the duration dependence of the process. 
The baseline hazard can be specified either parametrically or semi-parametrically. In the first 
case, a particular functional form is assumed and the Weibull is the parametric specification for 
the baseline hazard commonly used in the employment duration literature. For this reason I 
adopt a Weibull distribution for the baseline hazard, modelled as follow: 
 
1
0 )(
−= piijk pttλ . 
 
In practice the duration dependence is measured by the parameter p  that implies positive 
duration dependence whether it is higher than one, negative duration dependence whether is less 
than one and no duration dependence whether equal to one. As customary in this literature, the 
multiplicative term ijkv  takes into account the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, assumed 
to be distributed as a Gamma: 
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The key assumptions used in the multiple-spells duration model are that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is independent of the observed covariates and usually enters the hazard function 
multiplicatively. Given these elements, the probability of surviving in the origin state for the 
elapsed duration t  is expressed by a survivor function defined as: 
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and substituting with the definition of the integrated hazard function, I can rewrite the above 
equation as follow: 
 { }),,,|(exp),,,|( θβθβ vxtvxtS nini Λ−= . 
 
This expression defines the individual contribution to the likelihood function of a right censored 
spell, written in term of probability of surviving. Now I define the individual contributions to 
the likelihood function of a complete spell with duration nit  in the origin state before transiting 
to stable work: 
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Then, supposing a model without unobserved heterogeneity, I define the individual likelihood 
contribution with a sequence of spells nit  as follows: 
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where Nd  is a dummy indicator variable equals to one whether the individual transits from 
temporary to permanent employment in the thn spell and zero otherwise, while Nr  is a dummy 
variable, equal to one when the spell under consideration is censored and zero otherwise. The 
log-likelihood function is estimated both for the pre and the post-reform period. Moreover, I use 
robust standard error to correct the usual distortion due to the effects of clustered data. 
Introducing the unobserved heterogeneity in the model becomes more complex, leading to the 
class of the mixture models. In fact, since the iv  are unobservable, there is no possibilities to 
condition on them, but they are integrated over all possible values to obtain the so-called 
unconditional probabilities. As stated before, the multiplicative term iv  are distributed as a 
Gamma and let us suppose that they are identically and independently distributed for all 
individuals. 
Thus the individual likelihood function for the transition out to temporary employment is so 
defined: 
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5. Empirical results 
 
In this section I first discuss the results of the PH model for the transitions out of temporary 
employment based on the Weibull specification which imposes a particular monotonic shape for 
the baseline hazard. The second set of results is from a piecewise constant baseline hazard 
specification adopted to check the robustness of the Weibull model once I have relaxed the 
parametric assumptions about the shape of baseline hazard. 
 
5.1 Weibull model and duration dependence 
 
Estimation results summarized in table 3 cover the 1992-2002 period in order to provide a 
preliminary evidence on the conversion pattern of temporary into permanent jobs during the 
‘90s. Column (1) shows the results for the model not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
while in column (2) I estimate a frailty PH model accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity 
among individuals. In order to do this, I introduce a multiplicative Gamma-distributed error 
term in the hazard function. Both specifications report the estimates for several individual 
characteristics that are consistent with the main indication of the empirical literature on job 
search model (Sciulli, 2006; Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005). 
Moreover, columns (3) and (4) report the results for female and male workers. As can be seen 
from the results in column (2), the estimated coefficients in the PH model controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity are substantially the same of those in column (1), nonetheless the 
variance of gamma error term is positive and statistically significant (0.121). Likelihood ratio 
test of zero unobserved heterogeneity is also rejected, indicating the frailty model is preferred to 
the reference non-frailty model. However, given that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
does not make a difference in the sense that leaves the estimated coefficients and the duration 
dependence parameter p  basically unchanged, I conclude that the other PH models may be 
accurately estimated without controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity.7 
Referring to the estimated coefficients of the covariates included in the model emphasize how 
they affect the hazard of exiting out of temporary employment. Column (1) indicates that the 
probability of finding a permanent job is positively affected by age. This effect may capture a 
sort of job tenure impact which is increasing with age. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate 
another PH specification that controls for on the job tenure, finding that longer market 
experience raises the hazard rate of transiting into permanent employment, probably capturing 
                                                 
7 A similar conclusion has been found in on other microeconometric studies of employment duration 
model, as for instance Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon (2005).   
the impact of workers’ skills on the future employment status. I decide not to report these 
estimates which are available from the author. In addition from a gender perspective the age 
effect is larger for men, as evidenced in columns (3) and (4). At a first glance, this gender 
difference is confirmed  by the negative female coefficient (-0.162) in column (1) which remain 
basically unchanged once I control for the unobserved heterogeneity (-0.175). 
 
 
Table 3: Proportional Hazard model for transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment: 1992-2002, without and with unobserved heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All sample Female Male 
Age 0.107*** 
(11.30) 
0.111*** 
(11.33) 
0.080*** 
(5.50) 
0.126*** 
(9.85) 
 
Age^2 -0.002*** 
(-13.19) 
-0.002*** 
(-13.20) 
-0.001*** 
(-7.49) 
-0.002*** 
(-10.24) 
 
North-west 0.292*** 
(13.74) 
0.300*** 
(13.81) 
0.311*** 
(9.81) 
0.283*** 
(9.84) 
 
North-east 0.089** 
(3.65) 
0.099*** 
(4.18) 
0.115*** 
(3.39) 
0.050* 
(1.66) 
 
South -0.215*** 
(-9.09) 
-0.222*** 
(-9.02) 
-0.355*** 
(-9.35) 
-0.135*** 
(-4.40) 
 
Female -0.162*** 
(-10.32) 
-0.175*** 
(-10.64) 
- -  
Agriculture 0.537*** 
(5.28) 
0.073 
(1.36) 
0.655*** 
(4.62) 
0.423** 
(3.00) 
 
Mining industry 0.553*** 
(21.90) 
0.574*** 
(21.78) 
0.682*** 
(14.75) 
0.487*** 
(16.25) 
 
Metal industry 0.564*** 
(20.35) 
0.589*** 
(20.18) 
0.704*** 
(16.02) 
0.447*** 
(12.56) 
 
Mechanic industry 0.533*** 
(11.04) 
0.571*** 
(11.06) 
0.578*** 
(5.33) 
0.488*** 
(9.18) 
 
Construction 0.456*** 
(6.29) 
0.506*** 
(6.57) 
0.704*** 
(6.50) 
0.291** 
(3.09) 
 
Commerce 0.548*** 
(11.91) 
0.564*** 
(12.12) 
0.627*** 
(10.54) 
0.486*** 
(6.93) 
 
Communication 0.598*** 
(26.61) 
0.633*** 
(26.24) 
0.672*** 
(19.69) 
0.507*** 
(16.36) 
 
Credit 0.546*** 
(18.60) 
0.590*** 
(18.42) 
0.682*** 
(16.67) 
0.359*** 
(8.10) 
 
Foreigners 0.026 
(1.05) 
0.030 
(1.15) 
-0.261*** 
(-5.92) 
0.145*** 
(4.48) 
 
Blue-collar 0.556*** 
(26.76) 
0.623*** 
(24.16) 
0.615*** 
(17.30) 
0.526*** 
(20.31) 
White-collar 0.599*** 
(25.88) 
0.630*** 
(25.76) 
0.627*** 
(20.25) 
0.499*** 
(14.13) 
Economic growth 0.074*** 
(11.61) 
0.079*** 
(11.62) 
0.074*** 
(7.80) 
0.071*** 
(8.18) 
Gamma 
 
Likelihood ratio test 
 0.121 
 
39.12 
p-value (0.000) 
  
Note: the table reports coefficient estimates of Weibull duration model and the test z are reported in parenthesis. All 
specifications control also for year dummies ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 
The estimated coefficients also suggest strong regional variation in the pattern of exit from 
temporary employment towards a stable job. Generally, I find that to be resident in the Northern 
regions (mainly for those working in the North-West) affects positively the hazard rate of 
finding a permanent job and clearly the differences are larger for women than for men, as shown 
by the South coefficient in columns (3) and (4). The macro-region variables can be interpreted 
as a proxy for local labour market conditions that are usually captured using local 
unemployment rate and in this case, they confirm the dualistic structure of the Italian labour 
market. Focusing on the impact of economic growth, the estimated coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting how the hazard rate of transiting from a temporary to a 
permanent job is positively affected by the economic cycle. In practice, this means better 
outside options for the workers and a higher incentive for the employer to retain the temporary 
workers at the end of the contract.  
On the other hand, to be a foreign worker affects positively the hazard of exiting from 
temporary employment although this effect is not statistically significant in column (1). Quite 
different are the estimated coefficients if we look at gender differences. For women we detect a 
negative and significant coefficient (-0.261), indicating that non-Italians women have a lower 
probability of reaching a stable job, while for men the effect is positive (0.145) and this may be 
in line with expectation given the high diffusion of non-Italians workers in some sectors and in 
well-defined contractual type as interim work which may facilitate the transition to a permanent 
work after a probationary period.8 
In the empirical studies on labour market transitions, the job-related characteristics are found to 
be an important factor in explaining the differences in the hazard of exit from the state of 
temporary workers. For this reason table 4 reports the same PH model but distinguishing 
between blue-collar and white-collar, in order to investigate whether the occupational status is a 
source of different labour transitions. At a first glance, the female dummy displays a positive 
and statistically significant effect for the white-collar in column (1), while the opposite is 
reported in column (2) for the blue-collar category, in line with the traditional results in the 
literature. Even though the nature of the data makes not possible to identify the source of this 
specific result, sample composition may provide a first explanation. Furthermore, adding more 
evidence to the previous results for the foreign workers, I detect a positive impact on the hazard 
rate of transiting form a temporary to a permanent job for non-Italians workers only in the blue-
collar group, which represents the category of jobs in the industry sector. 
                                                 
8 The idea is that in some sectors as manufacturing and mechanic the increasing diffusion of non-Italians 
workers has been emphasized by the introduction of new flexible contracts such as interim work which 
favours to employ the worker for a short period and to test his skills, so providing a possible path towards 
a stable jobs.   
Concerning the regional variation, the estimated coefficients summarized in table 4 indicate a 
larger penalty in the Southern regions for blue-collar workers, in this sense emphasizing the 
traditional weakness of industry sector in these regions. 
 
 
Table 4: Proportional Hazard model for transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment: 1992-2002, by job-related characteristics 
 
 (1) (1) 
 White-collar Blue-collar 
Age 0.097** 
(2.96) 
0.099*** 
(5.48) 
Age^2 -0.001** 
(-2.06) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.10) 
North-west 0.298*** 
(7.10) 
0.272*** 
(6.48) 
North-east -0.067 
(-1.31) 
0.030 
(0.69) 
South -0.027 
(-0.56) 
-0.079* 
(-1.85) 
Female 0.072** 
(2.19) 
-0.062* 
(-1.91) 
Agriculture -0.031 
(-0.20) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
Mining industry 0.297*** 
(4.28) 
0.056 
(1.37) 
Metal industry 0.254 
(3.22) 
-0.012 
(-0.28) 
Mechanic industry 0.065 
(0.56) 
0.141 
(1.58) 
Construction 0.058 
(0.53) 
-0.191 
(-1.61) 
Commerce 0.271*** 
(3.63) 
1.22*** 
(3.95) 
Communication 0.211*** 
(3.20) 
-0.114*** 
(-2.61) 
Credit 0.116* 
(1.68) 
-0.097** 
(-2.01) 
Foreigners 0.018 
(0.19) 
0.140*** 
(3.47) 
Economic growth 0.093*** 
(6.60) 
0.123*** 
(9.44) 
Note: the table reports the coefficient estimates of a Weibull duration model and the 
test z are reported in parenthesis. All specifications control also for year dummies. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
 
Estimation results summarized in table 5 display the results from a PH model with Weibull 
specification for the baseline hazard, comparing the pre and post-reform period in order to 
investigate whether the Treu package has modified the impact of the observable characteristics 
on the hazard rate of moving from temporary to a stable job and in what direction. With regard 
to individual characteristics, the age coefficient is larger for both women and men in the post 
reform period as evidenced in columns (3) and (4), probably capturing the positive impact of 
job experience on the hazard rate of exiting from temporary employment. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficients for the geographical dummies indicate that the Treu package has not 
substantially modified the traditional duality of the Italian labour market. However, the higher 
degree of flexibility and the introduction of new flexible contracts has reduced the negative 
effect of being resident in the South,  as shown by coefficient in columns (3) and (4). Also the 
North-West area reports a positive effect on the hazard rate, significantly larger in the post-
reform period. 
Moreover, the gender differences increase in the post-reform period if we look at the female 
coefficient in table 5, as well as the economic growth coefficient shows a negative impact in the 
pre-reform period characterized by the 1992-93 recession and a positive and significant sign in 
the post-reform period, capturing the influence of the economic cycle on labour market 
transitions. A further interesting result concerns the foreign workers. In the pre-reform period 
being a non-Italians worker clearly reduces the hazard rate of moving into a stable job both for 
women and men. Differently the introduction of Treu package has modified this pattern and 
mainly for men the estimated coefficient for the post-reform period is positive (0.247). In 
practice the diffusion of temporary work agency (TWA) employment can have helped the entry 
in the Italian labour market of foreign workers, improving their human capital and providing 
them work experience, so increasing their chance of transiting into a permanent work, first of all 
in the industry sector.9 
One popular hypothesis is that an individual’s permanent employment prospects improve with 
the duration of the temporary employment spell, which is emphasized as positive duration 
dependence. In practice, the idea is the existence of a tenure effect in the job transitions, i.e. the 
probability of finding a permanent job after a temporary work experience increases with the 
length of the temporary contract. For this reason changes in duration dependence have important 
implications for labour market policy. In this section I investigate whether the Treu package has 
modified the positive duration dependence pattern, in what direction and the role of individual 
heterogeneity in explaining the large amount of variability provided by the estimates.   
Figures 1a and 1b display the hazard function in the pre-reform period by macro-regions and by 
gender. The general pattern shows that the level of estimated hazard rates differ widely between 
the Northern regions and the South as well as between women and men. Although the 
employment hazard increases for all groups considered with the duration of employment, the 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed description of TWA employment see Labour and Social Policy Minister (MLPS, 
2006). 
differences remain remarkable. At the same way, figures 2a and 2b display the hazard function 
but for the post-reform period. A first interesting result concerns the reduction in the difference 
between the South and the North-East in hazard function as well as a lower gender gap in 
hazard rate at higher duration of temporary employment.   
 
 
  Table 5: Proportional Hazard model for transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment: pre-reform period, 1992-1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           Pre reform Pre reform Post reform Post reform 
 Female Male Female Male 
Age 0.051 
(1.42) 
0.095*** 
(3.44) 
0.171*** 
(8.11) 
0.186*** 
(10.05) 
Age^2 -0.002** 
(-3.01) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.002*** 
(-7.92) 
-0.002*** 
(-8.70) 
North-west 0.197*** 
(3.43) 
0.166*** 
(3.04) 
0.381*** 
(8.49) 
0.427*** 
(10.23) 
North-east 0.147** 
(2.33) 
0.099* 
(1.67) 
0.100** 
(2.03) 
0.130** 
(2.89) 
South -0.526*** 
(-7.70) 
-0.384*** 
(-6.39) 
-0.232*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.046 
(-1.07) 
Agriculture 0.604* 
(1.81) 
0.481** 
(2.11) 
0.574** 
(2.86) 
0.645*** 
(3.61) 
Mining industry 0.706*** 
(8.07) 
0.648*** 
(11.26) 
0.816*** 
(11.64) 
0.524*** 
(11.02) 
Metal industry 0.875*** 
(11.66) 
0.524*** 
(7.79) 
0.695*** 
(9.51) 
0.484*** 
(8.52) 
Mechanic industry 0.677*** 
(2.73) 
0.745*** 
(7.63) 
0.726*** 
(5.24) 
0.603*** 
(7.85) 
Construction 0.977*** 
(4.45) 
0.363 
(1.26) 
0.724*** 
(4.98) 
0.379*** 
(3.48) 
Commerce 0.623*** 
(4.55) 
0.788*** 
(6.79) 
0.725*** 
(7.88) 
0.528*** 
(6.31) 
Communication 0.798*** 
(12.94) 
0.742*** 
(12.66) 
0.779*** 
(13.60) 
0.527*** 
(10.91) 
Credit 0.842*** 
(10.57) 
0.731*** 
(6.34) 
0.828*** 
(13.31) 
0.376*** 
(6.61) 
Foreigners -0.410*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.111 
(-1.63) 
-0.047 
(-0.81) 
0.247*** 
(5.70) 
Blue-collar 0.572*** 
(7.78) 
0.247*** 
(4.47) 
0.838*** 
(17.24) 
0.698*** 
(17.47) 
White-collar 0.390*** 
(6.08) 
0.243*** 
(3.23) 
0.698*** 
(15.64) 
0.538*** 
(10.91) 
Economic growth -0.034** 
(-2.18) 
-0.077*** 
(-5.13) 
0.208*** 
(14.07) 
0.234*** 
(17.96) 
Note: the table reports the coefficient estimates of a Weibull duration model and the test z are reported in parenthesis. All 
specifications control also for year dummies. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Daily Hazard Function for transition to permanent employment, pre-reform 
period, 1992-1997 
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b) by gender 
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Figure 2: Daily Hazard Function for transition to permanent employment, post-reform 
period, 1997-2002 
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b) by gender 
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The estimation results concerning the Weibull duration parameter p  for the pre and post-
reform period are summarized in table 6. In addition, as previously discussed, accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity does not make difference the estimated duration dependence 
parameters and given these results, I decide not to report the estimates for the model controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. At a first glance, the evolution of the parameter p  exhibits more 
or less a substantial reduction in the positive duration dependence in the post-reform period.10 
However, the persistence of positive duration dependence might indicate a sort of human capital 
accumulation effect, i.e. contract duration positively affects the hazard rate of moving out of 
temporary work towards a stable job. Even more pronounced is the reduction in duration 
dependence for women and white-collar, respectively from 1.37 to 1.25 and from 1.71 to 1.36.  
Generally, after the introduction of the Treu package, the estimated parameters are lower for all 
groups considered. A possible explanation might be related to the introduction of TWA 
employment which allows for interrupted working spells, so reducing the hazard rate of exit to 
permanent employment (Gagliarducci, 2005 and Sciulli, 2006). More in detail, the estimated 
parameters suggest that TWA employment displays a negative duration dependence, given a 
parameter p  less than one (0.96). This result indicates that contract duration affects negatively 
the probability of moving into a stable jobs. A similar conclusion might be attributed to fixed-
term works and to blue-collar workers and this could imply that declining duration dependence 
is an obvious result of the sorting process in these new contract types. 
Figures 3 and 4 display the hazard function both for fixed-term jobs and TWA works, 
confirming the negative duration dependence summarized in table 6.    
 
 
Table 6: Duration dependence parameter by personal and job-related characteristics 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
   
Female 1.37 
(0.026) 
1.25 
(0.017) 
Male 1.28 
(0.20) 
1.18 
(0.014) 
Blue-collar 1.25 
(0.034) 
0.99 
(0.013) 
White-collar 1.71 
(0.046) 
1.36 
(0.025) 
Fixed-term                - 0.99 
(0.013) 
Temporary work                - 0.96 
(0.027) 
Baseline hazard: Weibull specification. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Sciulli (2006) also finds a similar reduction in duration dependence parameter in the post-reform period 
looking at the transition out a non-working state to permanent employment (negative duration 
dependence). This result confirms the theoretical predictions, suggesting that in a more flexible labour 
market the duality between short-term and long-term unemployed increases, i.e. to be a long-term 
unemployed may be perceived as a low productivity signal by firms.   
Figure 3: Daily Hazard Function for transition to permanent employment, post-reform 
period, by gender, fixed-term contracts 
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Figure 4: Daily Hazard Function for transition to permanent employment, post-reform 
period, by gender, temporary works 
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section I assess the robustness of the previous results, relaxing the strict parametric 
assumptions about the Weibull distribution of the baseline hazard. Indeed imposing a particular 
functional form for the baseline hazard may lead to a problem of misspecification. A way to 
solve this problem is first to adopt a semi-parametric piecewise constant specification and then 
to interact each piece of the baseline hazard with a reform dummy to investigate whether the 
piece is proportionally shifted by the Treu reform. Such specifications have the additional 
advantage in that estimated coefficients will be less sensitive to the distributional assumptions 
applied for unobserved heterogeneity, as discussed in the context of proportional hazard models 
(Han and Hausman, 19990). In other words, the piecewise constant hazard model is another 
example of the proportional hazard models and allows for period-specific differences in the risk 
of job transition, modelling the baseline hazard as a step function with j interval so that 
jt λλ =)(0         jj t ττ <<−1  
where jτ  specify the discrete changes in the baseline hazard. The jth  interval starts at time 
1−jτ  and ends at time jτ  but in the each interval the baseline hazard is constant and equal to 
jλ . To investigate whether the duration dependence has increased or decreased  proportionally 
over time, I further interact the reform dummy with each piece of the baseline hazard, namely 
97rj ∗λ . 
Estimation results for the proportional hazard model with a piecewise constant baseline hazard 
are summarized in table 7. To avoid a collinearity, as estimation strategy, I decide to include a 
constant term and to exclude the first piece of the baseline hazard which makes possible to look 
directly at how each interval differs from that of the interval corresponding to the excluded 
variable. In practice the estimated coefficient for the baseline dummies are to be interpreted 
relative to the base category, i.e. the first month of the temporary employment spell. I identify at 
most 11 baseline steps, so providing a specific hazard rate for the following time periods: month 
1; month 2; month 3, months 4-6, months 7-9; months 10-12, months 13-24; months 25-36; 
months 37-48; months 49-60 and months>60. Since the purpose of this robustness check is to 
test for the changes in the duration dependence before and after the Treu reform, I will focus on 
the results for the baseline function and the relative impact of the reform and will only briefly 
concentrate on the estimates with respect to the other covariates of the traditional model, just 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
Tab 7: Proportional hazard model for transitions to permanent employment, piecewise 
baseline hazard 
 Pre reform period (1992-1997) Post reform period (1997-2002) 
 All sample Female Male All sample Female Male 
Age 
 
0.122** 
(2.16) 
0.225** 
(2.59) 
0.079 
(1.21) 
0.261*** 
(16.22) 
0.251*** 
(10.52) 
0.265*** 
(11.97) 
Age^2 
 
-0.001* 
(-1.69) 
-0.004** 
(-2.43) 
-0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.003*** 
(12.21) 
-0.003 
(-8.12) 
-0.003*** 
(-8.80) 
North-west 
 
0.137*** 
(3.09) 
0.161** 
(2.52) 
0.125** 
(2.01) 
0.370*** 
(10.85) 
0.352*** 
(7.07) 
0.381*** 
(8.14) 
North-east 
 
0.076 
(1.54) 
0.082 
(1.14) 
0.074 
(1.08) 
0.075** 
(2.04) 
0.005 
(0.11) 
0.142*** 
(2.83) 
South 
 
-0.205*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.262*** 
(3.40) 
-0.172** 
(-2.49) 
-0.013 
(-0.35) 
-0.085 
(-1.45) 
0.050 
(1.02) 
Female 
 
0.084** 
(2.45) 
  -0.084*** 
(-3.37) 
  
Agriculture 
 
0.315 
(1.52) 
0.312 
(0.78) 
0.406* 
(1.83) 
0.441*** 
(3.09) 
0.407** 
(1.98) 
0.494** 
(2.46) 
Mining 
industry 
 
0.559*** 
(10.99) 
0.578*** 
(6.31) 
0.565*** 
(9.21) 
0.594*** 
(14.75) 
0.652*** 
(9.01) 
0.568*** 
(11.70) 
Metal industry 
 
0.493*** 
(9.17) 
0.604*** 
(7.42) 
0.418*** 
(5.79) 
0.535*** 
(11.76) 
0.506*** 
(6.84) 
0.559*** 
(9.73) 
Mechanic 
industry 
 
0.658*** 
(6.69) 
0.488* 
(1.75) 
0.676*** 
(6.43) 
0.484*** 
(6.62) 
0.470*** 
(3.13) 
0.479*** 
(5.79) 
Construction 
 
0.613*** 
(3.16) 
0.793*** 
(3.39) 
0.474* 
(1.72) 
0.461*** 
(4.76) 
0.452*** 
(2.75) 
0.473*** 
(4.03) 
Commerce 
 
0.501*** 
(5.29) 
0.320** 
(2.17) 
0.677*** 
(5.56) 
0.613*** 
(9.35) 
0.609*** 
(6.06) 
0.617*** 
(7.33) 
Communication 
 
0.638*** 
(13.79) 
0.612*** 
(9.01) 
0.685*** 
(10.64) 
0.515*** 
(13.79) 
0.536*** 
(9.35) 
0.507*** 
(9.99) 
Credit 
 
0.636*** 
(9.49) 
0.640*** 
(7.46) 
0.660*** 
(5.49) 
0.570*** 
(13.87) 
0.632*** 
(10.15) 
0.498*** 
(8.82) 
Baseline hazard      
e2 
 
0.518*** 
(4.50) 
0.467*** 
(2.79) 
0.563*** 
(3.56) 
0.321*** 
(4.78) 
0.206** 
(1.99) 
0.403*** 
(4.56) 
e3 
 
0.643*** 
(5.66) 
0.508*** 
(3.03) 
0.754*** 
(4.88) 
0.290*** 
(4.24) 
0.250** 
(2.41) 
0.319*** 
(3.49) 
e4 
 
-0.055 
(-0.51) 
-0.312* 
(-1.93) 
0.140 
(0.97) 
-0.043 
(0.71) 
-0.065 
(-0.71) 
-0.027 
(-0.34) 
e5 
 
-0.022 
(-0.21) 
-0.148 
(-0.93) 
0.085 
(0.58) 
-0.363*** 
(-5.42) 
-0.374*** 
(3.72) 
-0.355 
(-3.95) 
e6 
 
0.075 
(0.69) 
0.206 
(1.34) 
-0.070 
(-0.45) 
-0.378*** 
(5.48) 
-0.362*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.391*** 
(-4.18) 
e7 
 
e8 
 
e9 
 
e10 
 
e11 
 
0.566*** 
(5.89) 
1.316*** 
(13.26) 
1.219*** 
(11.01) 
1.096*** 
(8.15) 
1.094*** 
(4.58) 
0.500*** 
(3.60) 
1.470*** 
(10.28) 
1.290*** 
(7.83) 
0.835*** 
(3.06) 
1.216*** 
(3.06) 
0.628*** 
(4.71) 
1.181*** 
(8.56) 
1.187*** 
(7.89) 
1.244*** 
(7.14) 
1.033*** 
(3.42) 
-0.071 
(-1.27) 
0.969*** 
(16.83) 
0.743*** 
(10.73) 
0.876*** 
(8.65) 
1.502*** 
(6.82) 
-0.057 
(-0.69) 
1.056*** 
(12.39) 
0.664*** 
(6.36) 
0.860*** 
(5.77) 
1.649*** 
(4.84) 
-0.082 
(-1.09) 
0.886*** 
(11.33) 
0.803*** 
(8.69) 
0.886*** 
(6.41) 
1.408*** 
(4.86) 
    Note: the table reports the coefficient estimates of a piecewise constant baseline hazard model and the test z are reported in 
parenthesis. All specifications control also for foreign status, white-collar, blue-collar and economic growth. *** Significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
The first important result worthy of a note is that both for women and men the estimated 
parameters of the baseline hazard for temporary employment duration are substantially lower in 
the post reform period, in this sense confirming the hypothesis widely discussed in the previous 
section that the Treu package has reduced the degree of duration dependence in the hazard rate 
of moving out of temporary employment. Baseline hazard coefficients in both periods exhibit 
more or less a positive value, with some exceptions. In particular the baseline parameters are 
positive for the first two time period. After the second period, however, the baseline hazard 
estimates are found to be negative, mainly in the post reform period. This tendency lasts until 
the sixth-seventh time period, implying a negative duration dependence in this interval. Even 
more pronounced, after the seventh time interval, is the change in sign in the baseline hazard 
coefficients which become strongly positive and volatile, mainly for women.      
 The last robustness check is summarized in table 8 which compares two model both for men 
and women, the first is a traditional piecewise baseline model while in the second each piece of 
the baseline hazard is interacted with a reform dummy in order to test whether the Treu package 
has proportionally shifted the hazard rate. The estimated coefficients imply a rather strong 
negative effect of the reform on hazard rate equally distributed by gender, resulting in a well-
defined and proportional reduction of each piece of the baseline hazard. In conclusion, results 
from semi-parametric baseline hazard tell a slightly different but more appealing story. Indeed, 
the hazard estimates are positive initially, then decline moving to negative duration dependence 
in the central time interval and finally increase substantially, reproducing the positive duration 
dependence already observed in the Weibull model. 
In addition, the results with respect to other explanatory variable for both specifications (tables 
7 and 8) are in accordance with one of the main implication of job-search theory and with the 
estimates discussed in the previous section.  
 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
The empirical evidence that the average hazard rate from temporary employment (towards a 
permanent work) rises with its duration is typically interpreted in literature as strong evidence 
for the hypothesis of positive structural duration dependence. This paper attempts to study the 
duration of temporary employment, focusing on the exit margin, and to investigate whether the 
introduction of Treu package in the 1997 has modified the duration dependence pattern in the 
probability of moving from a fixed-term work to a stable job. 
Tab 8: Proportional hazard model for transitions to permanent employment, piecewise 
baseline hazard 
 Piecewise Baseline Hazard Piecewise Baseline Hazard 
Interacted with the reform dummy 
  
 Female Male Female Male 
Age 
 
0.101*** 
(5.11) 
0.138*** 
(7.31) 
0.147*** 
(7.46) 
0.166*** 
(9.08) 
  
Age^2 
 
-0.001*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.001*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.002*** 
(-6.41) 
  
North-west 
 
0.251*** 
(7.00) 
0.229*** 
(6.87) 
0.258*** 
(7.58) 
0.238*** 
(7.42) 
  
North-east 
 
0.010 
(0.26) 
0.049 
(1.36) 
0.031 
(0.87) 
0.069** 
(1.99) 
  
South 
 
-0.130*** 
(-3.00) 
0.039 
(1.10) 
-0.132*** 
(-3.20) 
0.039 
(1.11) 
  
Agriculture 
 
0.207 
(1.32) 
0.144 
(0.90) 
0.143 
(0.96) 
0.149 
(0.98) 
  
Mining industry 
 
0.364*** 
(7.41) 
0.347*** 
(10.75) 
0.308*** 
(6.68) 
0.336*** 
(10.82) 
  
Metal industry 
 
0.341*** 
(7.43) 
0.306*** 
(7.9))3) 
0.307*** 
(7.07) 
0.295*** 
(7.94) 
  
Mechanic industry 0.270** 
(2.49) 
0.313*** 
(5.34) 
0.232** 
(2.25) 
0.300*** 
(5.32) 
  
Construction  
 
0.209* 
(1.68) 
0.147 
(1.39) 
0.162 
(1.36) 
0.124 
(1.22) 
  
Commerce 
 
0.239*** 
(3.63) 
0.353*** 
(5.10) 
0.213*** 
(3.57) 
0.352*** 
(5.49) 
  
Communication 
 
0.295*** 
(8.39) 
0.342*** 
(10.29) 
0.241*** 
(7.33) 
0.319*** 
(9.95) 
  
Credit 
 
0.302*** 
(7.03) 
0.218*** 
(4.56) 
0.248*** 
(6.17) 
0.194*** 
(4.20) 
  
Baseline hazard       
e2 
 
0.273*** 
(3.17) 
0.448*** 
(6.02) 
0.200* 
(1.94) 
0.399*** 
(4.50) 
  
e3 
 
0.311*** 
(3.62) 
0.455*** 
(6.07) 
0.238** 
(2.29) 
0.307*** 
(3.36) 
  
e4 
 
-0.151* 
(-1.94) 
-0.041 
(0.60) 
-0.087 
(-0.95) 
-0.055 
(-0.67) 
  
e5 
 
-0.314*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.268*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.404*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.406*** 
(-4.52) 
  
e6 
 
-0.201** 
(-2.46) 
-0.371*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.407*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.460*** 
(-4.97) 
  
e7 
 
0.106 
(1.54) 
0.082 
(1.31) 
-0.085 
(-1.03) 
-0.136* 
(-1.83) 
  
e8 
 
1.114*** 
(15.89) 
0.801*** 
(12.60) 
0.966*** 
(11.68) 
0.687*** 
(9.16) 
  
e9 
 
0.740*** 
(9.40) 
0.624*** 
(9.00) 
0.506*** 
(5.52) 
0.429*** 
(5.29) 
  
e10 
 
0.584*** 
(6.39) 
0.639*** 
(8.28) 
0.395*** 
(3.79) 
0.438*** 
(4.94) 
  
e11 
 
0.691*** 
(7.16) 
0.742*** 
(9.42) 
0.509*** 
(4.85) 
0.559*** 
(6.40) 
 
               Note: the table reports the coefficient estimates of a piecewise constant baseline hazard model and the test z 
are reported in parenthesis. All specifications control also for foreign status, white-collar, blue-collar, a 
reform dummy and economic growth. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
Indeed the partial labour market reform and the liberalization of flexible contracts in the Italian 
labour market have attracted the attention of many researchers and policy-makers. Empirical 
studies have tried to assess whether temporary jobs provide a stepping-stone towards a stable 
employment or an endless trap in the precariousness, but mixed employment effects do not 
provide a clear signal on the good performance of the flexible contracts in terms of subsequent 
careers and wage.  
Parametric and semi-parametric continuous time duration model have been employed to study 
the duration of temporary work spells and to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, 
exploiting a large administrative dataset for the ‘90s. As already discussed, the results obtained 
indicate that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity does not matter and the estimated 
parameters with regards to duration dependence remains basically unchanged.  
The main findings emphasize how the Treu reform has significantly reduced the duration 
dependence parameters in the probability of transiting from a temporary work to a permanent 
job and that this result is robust to different specifications adopted for the baseline hazard, both 
parametric and semi-parametric. Moreover, results on positive duration dependence might 
indicate the existence of a human capital accumulation effect, as suggested in other empirical 
studies. The reduction in duration dependence differs markedly with respect to observable 
characteristics and it is larger for women and white-collar in the post reform period. 
An even stronger conclusion could be drawn, concerning the analysis for specific contract types: 
once I have controlled for different contractual arrangements, positive duration dependence in 
the employment hazard rate disappears or even becomes negative, at least for the temporary 
work agency (TWA) employment. This might indicate that for interim work the duration of the 
work spell affects negatively the hazard rate of moving into a permanent employment. Given 
the somewhat restrictive information of the dataset, more research to test for the robustness of 
the negative duration dependence in TWA employment seems warranted. Finally I conclude 
emphasizing the role of individuals’ heterogeneity in terms of personal and job-related 
characteristics in explaining a large amount of differences in hazard rates and, more in general, 
in labour market chances.      
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